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ABSTRACT
The Financials Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the expensing of
stock options with FAS 123 (R). As of March 2006, 749 companies had accelerated the
vesting of their employee stock options and avoided a reduction in their reported profits
that otherwise would have occurred under the new standard. There are many different
motives for the acceleration strategy, and the focus of this study is to determine whether
shareholders viewed these motives as either positive or negative. A favorable return
subsequent to an acceleration announcement would signify that shareholder’s viewed
management’s motives as positive. An unfavorable return subsequent to an acceleration
announcement would signify that shareholder’s viewed management’s motives as
negative. The evidence from this study suggests that shareholders reacted favorably, on
average, to acceleration announcements. However, these results lack statistical
significance and are based on a small sample, thus, they should be interpreted with
caution.

Introduction
The passing of FAS 123 (R) in December 2004 was the culmination of a great
deal of controversy regarding the treatment of stock options. The new standard enacted
by FASB requires that firms expense stock awards over their vesting period. Prior to this
standard, firms were allowed to simply disclose the anticipated stock option expense
among the footnotes of their financial statements. FAS 123 (R) would require that the
associated expense now be listed on the face of the income statement and therefore
reduce reported operating profits. In order to avoid booking millions in stock options
expenses, hundreds of firms chose to accelerate the vesting periods of their employee
stock options (ESOs). By accelerating the vesting periods, these firms ensured that the
associated stock option expense would never be booked on their income statements.
According to a Bear Sterns report, 749 companies accelerated the vesting of their stock
options in anticipation of adopting FAS 123 (R) with an estimated $6 billion in expense
disappearing from future income statements.1 However, not every company that faced
increased compensation expenses chose to accelerate their vesting periods. It is
important to learn the motives of the accelerating companies and also the repercussions
of their actions.
The acceleration of stock options is intriguing because, at first, it appears to be a
successful approach to avoid the very expenses that FAS 123 (R) would require. Some
might view these actions as a devious way to avoid recording an otherwise required
expense, thus tarnishing the company’s image to current and potential investors. Also,
investors may wonder why a company would want to conceal such expenses and perhaps
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convey an inaccurate financial standing. Inferences could then be made about how
forthcoming management was about other significant issues. Some have cited this
acceleration as an act of “accounting gimmickry.” If investors agree with this
characterization, then they will react unfavorably to the acceleration announcement.
However, most CEOs claim that the acceleration was in the best interest of their
companies. Eliminating these expenses would help to avoid violating debt covenants and
meet earnings benchmarks. If shareholders believe that management is acting in the best
interest of the company, then they will react favorably when the acceleration
announcement is made. However, if shareholders feel that management is simply
employing tactics to hide necessary expenses, they will respond unfavorably and the
company’s stock price will reflect these beliefs. My research aims to provide evidence
on shareholders’ perceptions of managements’ motives by analyzing stock price reactions
to acceleration announcements.
The state of the options, underwater or in the money, is a potentially important
factor. I examine whether the market’s reaction is influenced by the state of the options
that were accelerated. Since underwater stock options are of lesser value to employees, it
is argued that they should never be regarded as expenses due to the unlikelihood that they
will ever be exercised. Management hopes that investors are aware of this and therefore
will react positively to their acceleration. I investigate whether the market’s reaction is a
function of the state of the options.
Another factor that could potentially affect the market’s reaction is the amount
accelerated as a percentage of market capitalization. My sample is comprised of the 64
largest accelerators in terms of expense avoided. Scaling the amount of expense
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accelerated by each company’s market capitalization results in more comparable figures
across firms of different sizes. The larger the percentage accelerated the larger the
expected market reaction. I examine whether the market’s reaction to the announcement
is a function of this percentage.
My empirical results are inconclusive as to whether option acceleration is to the
benefit or detriment of shareholders. I find an average abnormal stock return of 0.05%
for the days surrounding the acceleration announcements, but this amount is not
statistically distinguishable from zero. I also fail to find compelling evidence that the
market’s reaction is a function of the state of the options at the time of acceleration. I
find no significant correlation between the returns for these underwater and in the money
options. Table 4 seems to suggest a difference in the returns provided, but only 6
observations of in the money option acceleration make it difficult to get statistical
significance. Lastly, I do not find compelling evidence that the market’s reaction is a
function of the amount of expense accelerated as a percentage of market capitalization. I
find no significant correlation between the amount accelerated and the abnormal returns
during the three day window surrounding the announcement. The results of this study are
explained in greater detail in the sections that follow.

History of FAS 123 (R)
During the 1970s, ESOs were a new form of employee compensation and FASB
was not yet sure how they should be treated. In 1972, the Accounting Principles Board
(APB) issued Opinion 25 which stated that the expenses of ESOs be reported only if the
exercise price was less than the stock price at the grant date. This became known as the
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intrinsic value method. Since most companies issued options at or above market price,
these expenses were generally not reported on income statements. This resulted in
millions of ESOs being issued within the next 30 years and none of the corresponding
compensation expense being recorded. The APB justified their ruling by stating that no
reliable method for calculating an accurate compensation expense existed. The BlackScholes formula would be published just one year later, yet this accounting treatment
would be allowed for more than 3 decades.2 Technology related and entrepreneurial start
up companies reaped the largest benefits from this accounting treatment.
The tech boom grew stronger through the next few decades, and is attributed with
causing the market bubble of the 1990s and also its subsequent burst. Many blamed the
absence of compensation costs from financials as a contributing factor to their
inaccuracy. FASB decided to revisit the issue in hopes of improving financial statement
accuracy. In October 1995, FAS 123 was issued which “encouraged” companies to use
the fair-value method of reporting, but still allowed usage of the intrinsic value method.
FAS 123 was intended to supersede APB 25, but both industry and congressional
pressure persuaded FASB to issue this comparably weaker stance. Nearly every company
chose to maintain the intrinsic value method, and their corresponding stock option
expense remained hidden amongst their financial statement footnotes.
The accounting scandals during the beginning of the 21st Century brought
financial statement transparency to the attention of FASB once again. This time, they
would not succumb to congressional or tech lobby pressure. The passing of SarbanesOxley in 2002 gave FASB more power and independence, no longer forcing it to rely on
voluntary contributions from public companies and accounting firms. These preceding
2
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factors led FASB to issue FAS 123 (R) in March of 2004. This standard requires all
companies to recognize compensation expense related to ESOs at their fair market value.
The options are to be expensed over their vesting period, which typically lasts three to
five years. Though this statement was three decades in the making, it was still met with
resistance. By treating stock options as an income-reducing expense, some companies’
earnings would have dropped as much as 6 percent in 2004 and 8 percent in 2003,
according to Credit Suisse First Boston. Congressional pressures persisted as well. Five
senators, led by Barbara Boxer, attempted to pass a bill in March of 2004 that would
require a full assessment of the costs and benefits of the expensing of all stock options
before the new FASB standard would be enforced by the SEC. This bill would
potentially push back the mandatory expensing of options for 3 more years. Senator
Boxer, from California, had a large stake in the passing of 123 (R) because the hundreds
of options-loving Silicon Valley companies in her state would suffer the greatest if the
statement was passed. Contention was also heard from hundreds of others who fiercely
contested any changes to the current rules. According to the same CSFB study, as of
January 2005, 77% of the S&P 500 still employed the intrinsic value method and
recognized no stock option expense. The financials of these 383 companies would have
to undergo large changes since the fair value method would be required. FASB would
not back down this time though. Boxer’s bill eventually failed and the new rule was
adopted in December 2004 and would require companies to begin expensing during their
first reporting period after June 15, 2005.

5

Justification for Mandating the Expensing of Options
FASB cited four main reasons for issuing 123 (R). The first reason was to address
the concerns of financial statement users. They noted that since the accounting scandals
of Enron and WorldCom, users were more wary then ever about the accuracy of financial
statements. FASB intended to improve transparency by requiring expensing which
would more accurately reflect the economic consequences that issuing ESOs has on a
company.
The second reason for issuing the statement was to improve comparability of
financial information among companies. At the time of issuance, some companies were
using the intrinsic method and others the fair value method. This created problems when
investors were attempting to easily compare the financials of two companies. In order to
accurately compare the profits of two companies, an investor would have to search their
footnotes for any compensation expenses that would affect the company’s profits.
The third reason was related to the premise of improving financial reporting
simplicity. FASB also wanted to simplify U.S GAAP with the passing of FAS 123 (R).
They wanted to require all companies to follow the same accounting standard, without
the option of using Opinion 25’s intrinsic value method. U.S GAAP has been criticized
as being confusing, so FASB has been making strides to improve simplicity.
The final reason that FASB stated for its passing the statement was to converge
with international accounting standards. In February 2004, the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) issued IFRS 2 which requires that all associated entities
recognize compensation expense under the fair value method. Since members of the EU
and other important trade concerns conform to IAS, the U.S has been taking steps
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towards convergence for many years. FASB wanted to ensure that the U.S. did not fall
behind with regards to any new accounting policies and also that American financials
would be easily comparable to international ones. This would also help ease the burden
placed on companies who report financials under both U.S GAAP and IASB standards.

Responses to the Issuance of FAS 123 (R)
Upon the mandating of expensing options in December 2004, companies had the
choice of taking three different paths. The first, obviously, was to begin expensing
during their first financial period following June 15, 2005.
Another path taken by hundreds of companies was the early adoption of the fair
value expensing method. Coke was one of the first companies to voluntarily begin
expensing their ESOs. Under persuasion from their largest shareholder, Warren E.
Buffet, Coke began employing the fair value method during the fourth quarter of 2002.
Buffet believed that companies that chose to adopt FAS 123 early would, “develop a
reputation for being believable, for not hyping things, and will be valued more than those
whose CEO is flim-flamming (investors).” 3 This is probably why Gillette and The
Washington Post Co., two companies that also boast Buffet as a member of their board,
decided to adopt early as well. The New York Times Co. also decided to adopt early but
cited a different reason for doing so. Their Vice President of Corporate Communications,
Catherine Mathis, stated, “We decided to adopt FAS 123 (R) early because we wanted to
reflect the charges at the beginning of the year and felt it was good corporate governance
to do so.” 4 If the best corporate governance would be participating in early adoption,
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then why did some companies choose to go down a different path? There were obviously
benefits to be reaped by companies that chose to accelerate rather than adopt early.
The third path, the one on which this paper focuses, was to accelerate the vesting
period of options. Since the vesting period would be completed before 123 (R) took
effect, the related compensation expense would avoid the income statement. The 749
companies from the Bear Stearns report who chose to accelerate options would be able to
list their entire compensation expense within their footnotes with no contention from the
SEC. This seems to be a popular strategy amongst technology companies in particular.
Of the 749 companies that chose to accelerate, 33% of them were from the technology
sector. In my sample 55% of the 62 largest accelerators are technology companies. The
technology industry’s eagerness to hand out ESOs in the 1990s has been blamed by some
for the stock bubble around the same time, and also the resulting burst. Technology
companies presumably stood to suffer the most from expensing so it is unsurprising that
they comprise the largest percentage of the acceleration population. Healthcare
companies ranked second in frequency comprising 21% of my sample. My research
aims to determine the motives of management for choosing this response to statement
123 (R). To provide evidence on shareholders’ perceptions I investigate the market’s
reaction to acceleration announcements.

Motives for Acceleration
Managers may have numerous motives for choosing the acceleration strategy over
the other available options. Positive motives should be associated with positive abnormal
returns. In these cases, investors will assume that management is acting in the
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shareholders’ best interests and react favorably to the acceleration announcement.
Negative abnormal returns should be attributed negative motives of management. In
these cases, investors will react unfavorably to the announcements and assume that
management is not acting in the shareholders’ best interests. An example of a positive
motive would be to keep expenses as low as possible in order to increase reported profits.
If this was perceived to be management’s motive, then shareholders would react
positively because it would seem that they were acting in a way to improve or maintain
the company’s stock price. This would be beneficial for the shareholder’s investment and
they would react perhaps by purchasing more stock, thus raising the stock price.
Sometimes the perception that management is accelerating vesting just to increase
reported profits can also be viewed as a negative motive. Such actions could potentially
increase managements’ bonuses and therefore cost shareholders’ money. This example
highlights how important shareholders’ perceptions are because the same act can be
viewed in two drastically different ways.
Another motive that would be viewed in a positive light would be accelerating
vesting in order to avoid violating debt covenants. Many debt covenants are dependent
upon the working capital of a company. If expenses increase drastically, then the
company may fall below the required working capital amount and creditors would be
able to demand immediate repayment. This would be detrimental for both management
and shareholders. Hence, if investors perceived the motive to be to maintain debt
covenants, they would react positively.
Many companies chose to accelerate only “underwater” stock options, a tendency
that I discuss in detail in the next section. Many of these options were well underwater
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and posed a very slim chance to ever become profitable. Some see the acceleration of
significantly underwater options as a positive motive and an action that will benefit the
company. The CEO of Linear Technology, Lothar Maier, chose to accelerate his
company’s options that were well underwater claiming that, “Acceleration may have a
positive effect on employee morale, retention, and perception of option value.” 5 Though
it was extremely unlikely that the options would ever be profitable, Maier hoped that his
employees would view them as such since he was giving them the right to exercise years
ahead of schedule. Accelerating in order to improve employee morale and give them
something with a negligible economic cost may be viewed as a positive motive.
There are also perceived negative motives that would cause an investor to react
negatively to the announcement of acceleration. Since ESOs are granted in order to
improve employee retention and motivation, acceleration essentially removes associated
benefits. With their options fully vested, employees would be free to leave the company
and exercise their options whenever they please. ESOs also aim to align the interests of
employees and investors. If employees leave the company due to the advanced vesting of
their options, they will no longer be working for the benefits of the investors.
Shareholders will be skeptical about why the company is willing to forfeit all the
associated benefits that stock options give them in the first place. They may perceive the
costs of acceleration as being irrationally high and hence react negatively to the
announcement.
Another perceived negative motive would be management’s desire to reduce
transparency. The recent accounting scandals have raised issues about the transparency
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of financial statements and some investors may view this acceleration as yet another way
to manage a company’s earnings. The perception that management would engage in
earnings management to intentionally inflate their profits would influence negative
reactions to acceleration. As noted before, this assumption that acceleration is performed
to increase reported profits can be viewed in both a negative and positive light to
investors. There is also belief amongst some investors that managers will always choose
accounting policies that benefit themselves and not shareholders. Investors with such
beliefs will automatically attribute acceleration to negative motives by management.

The Effect of “Underwater” Stock Options
As mentioned earlier, many firms chose to accelerate only options that were well
underwater, meaning that the strike price for these options was well above the market
price on the date of acceleration. Of the 749 accelerators, 84% advanced the vesting of
underwater options only. In my study, 90% of the largest 62 accelerators advanced only
underwater options as well. There is a debate over whether these underwater options
should even be considered as expenses, given the unlikely chances that they will ever
become profitable to those holding them. Julia Harper, CFO of RasiSys feels that,
“Options like these that are underwater will never get exercised- our employees view
them as having no value, we view them as having no value, yet (under the rule) you’re
going to be running them through your income statement as if they had value.”6 Most
companies who chose to accelerate the vesting of such options view their strategy as a
way to avoid an unnecessary expense for options that are likely to never be exercised.
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They also rely on savvy, informed investors to read the footnotes of their financials to
learn about the status of their accelerated options. Given that investors understand the
implausibility of these options ever being cashed in, then they will understand why
accelerating their vesting is in the best interest of the company and is not intended to
deceive. However, given the non-zero probability that these options may become
profitable, they should not be considered completely worthless.

Prior Academic Literature
Previous studies have been conducted that focus on the effects of stock options
acceleration prior to the passing of FAS 123 (R). Balsam, Reitenga and Yin (2007) find a
positive association between stock returns and the announcement to accelerate. An
average abnormal return of positive 0.524 percent was attributed to the three-day window
surrounding the announcement. They claim that the accelerated vesting of options is a
form of earnings management that benefits equity investors. This is the only previous
study, though, that finds a positive association between stock price and acceleration
announcements.
Negative stock price reactions surrounding announcement dates are reported by
Choudhary, Rajgopal, and Ventachalam (2006). They claim this negative market reaction
is value-destroying for the firms and exemplifies poor corporate governance.
Management succeeded in increasing their reported earnings by an average of 2.3%, but
at the cost of displeasing investors. They also attribute a decrease of 1% in market
capitalization to the decision to accelerate vesting.
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Elayan, Meyer, and Li (2006) find that acceleration does not benefit shareholders
like its proponents have claimed. They conclude that the decision to accelerate was made
specifically for management’s own self interest and simultaneously made their own
options more valuable.
All three of these previous studies used different parameters, measurements, and
econometric models to come to their very different conclusions. Since all provided such
different results, I feel that it is necessary to conduct more research into this topic to
determine the true effects of acceleration. My tests will differ from the three
aforementioned studies and I hope to obtain my own conclusions on the topic of option
acceleration and how it affected shareholder equity.

Hypotheses
My primary hypothesis relates to how the market reacts upon learning the firm’s
decisions to accelerate vesting periods. When the firms announce their intentions to
accelerate, investors will be reacting to this information. As I have previously stated,
investors believing that there are positive motives for accelerating will respond favorably
while those believing that there are negative motives behind the acceleration will respond
unfavorably. This leads to my first hypothesis, which is stated in the null form:
H1: The acceleration of ESO vesting periods in anticipation of FAS 123 (R) is not
associated with changes in stockholder’s equity.
While overall trends will be important to identify, it is possible that other factors
also affected how the market responded to the acceleration announcements. The
argument that “underwater” stock options have little to no value may play a role in the
reaction of the market when such options are accelerated. The argument has been made
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that informed and savvy investors will be aware of the value of “underwater” stock
options and thus respond to their acceleration in a less negative manner. Contrarily,
companies who choose to accelerate in-the-money options will face less positive
reactions from their investors. In the second of my tests, I examine whether or not the
acceleration of entirely “underwater” options leads to different returns than those of
companies who decided to accelerate in-the-money options. This leads to my second
hypothesis, which is stated in the null form:
H2: The acceleration of “underwater” ESOs is not associated with different
returns than the acceleration of entirely in-the-money options.
Another factor that may affect how the market responds to option acceleration is
the amount that a firm has decided to accelerate. A firm that decides to accelerate an
especially large amount of options may face different reactions than one that chooses to
only accelerate a comparably smaller amount. For this study, I obtain data on the 64
largest monetary accelerators but not the largest in terms of percentage of market
capitalization. In my third test, I account for each firm’s market capitalization when
examining their stock returns for the associated period. I measure the amount of
compensation expense that the firms have accelerated and calculate this amount as a
percentage of market capitalization. This scales all of the companies’ acceleration
amounts with respect to their overall company size. Companies that accelerate a larger
expense as it relates to their market cap are likely to face larger market reactions than
those who accelerated correspondingly smaller percentages. This leads to my third
hypothesis, which is also stated in the null form:
H3: The amount of options accelerated, as it relates to market capitalization, is
not associated with shareholders’ responses to acceleration announcements.
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Description of Sample
Due to the costly nature of hand-collecting data, my study examines only the
acceleration and resulting market responses of the 64 largest monetary accelerators. I
identified these companies from a Bear Stearns report by McConnell, Pegg, Senyek, and
Mott. Each company in my sample accelerated at least $20 million in compensation
expense with the largest accelerator being Sun Microsystems who accelerated $400
million. Of the 64 companies in my sample, I am only able to conduct empirical tests on
62 of them due to an inability to locate 2 of the companies’ acceleration dates. The New
York Times stated in their 2004 10Q that they chose to accelerate options in June 2004,
but did not designate the specific date. Since my tests rely upon a three day window
surrounding the acceleration announcement, I omit the New York Times from my tests to
avoid any inaccuracy that an unspecific date would bring to my results. I was also unable
to locate the acceleration date of Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries ltd. Teva was involved
in a merger with IVAX Corporation, a fellow accelerator, on July 25, 2005 which makes
pinpointing their acceleration date difficult. Table 1 provides a complete listing of the
companies used in this study.
The industry composition of my study sample is similar to the Bear Stearns 749
company population. Information Technology companies comprised 55% of my sample
with Healthcare companies comprising 21%. This is similar to the entire Bear Stearns
population with Information Technology and Healthcare companies comprising 33% and
19%, respectively (see Table 2). Since ESO programs were most popular among
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technology companies, it is not surprising that they comprise the largest percentage of the
accelerator population.
My sample is also similar regarding the percentage of companies that decided to
accelerate underwater options. 10% of my sample accelerated in-the-money options
while 16% of the entire population did the same. If a company did choose to accelerate
in the money options, they would be required to record an expense equal to the intrinsic
value of the options during the period of acceleration. Also, when in the money options
are accelerated, employees could potentially exercise them immediately and leave the
company. For these reasons, it is not surprising that most companies chose to only
accelerate underwater options.

Testing
For my testing, I designate a three day window surrounding each acceleration
announcement. To find the acceleration dates for all of the companies, I use a LexisNexis search to locate the 8K’s where the announcements were made. Within each 8K, it
is noted when each company’s board approved the proposal to accelerate options, which
is the same day that they became exercisable. I use this date as the acceleration date and
use the trading days before and after (-1, +1) to form a three day window. I then use
CRSP to obtain stock returns for each company’s three day window and also the
corresponding market returns for the same timeframe. I compound these returns to buyand-hold returns over the three day window:
3 day buy-and-hold return = [(1 + R -1) * (1 + R 0) * (1+ R 1)] -1

16

I then subtract the compounded market return from this figure to get the abnormal return
for each stock over the three day window surrounding the acceleration announcement. I
then obtain the mean and t-statistic of the abnormal returns.
Next, I test if the abnormal returns are a function of the state of the options at the
time of acceleration. I separated the returns into two categories: in the money and
underwater. Then I perform a two sample t-test to obtain the mean abnormal return for
each category, getting the t-statistic, and the corresponding p-value. A high t-statistic
signifies that the mean of the abnormal returns were a function of the state of the options
at the time of acceleration. The p-value indicates the statistical significance of the t-test.
A significant p-value, less than 0.05, would show that there is considerable evidence in
the data to reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternate hypothesis, with 95%
confidence. Thus, the closer the p-value is to zero, the more confident I can be about
rejecting the null hypothesis.
The last test I perform is a regression of abnormal returns on the amount of stock
options accelerated as a percentage of market capitalization. I perform this regression to
determine if abnormal returns were a function of how large of a percentage each
company accelerated. In theory, investors would react more to a larger percentage being
accelerated than they would to a smaller percentage being accelerated. The larger the
amount being vested immediately would mean that a larger amount of expense would
never hit the income statement. According to many investors, the more expense that was
accelerated, the more the transparency of the company’s financials was disrupted. This
view that transparency was reduced would cause investors to react negatively to large
acceleration announcements. If investors have the alternate view, that acceleration is

17

positive, then they will react more positively to large acceleration announcements. The Rsquare from the regression reflects the fit of the line to the plot of returns and their
corresponding acceleration percentages. The higher the R-square, the higher the
explanatory power of the model.

Results
Table 3 provides the mean abnormal return for my entire sample, 0.05%, and the
median of 0.09%. The t-statistic that I calculate is 0.082. The corresponding p-value,
0.934, shows that there is not considerable evidence in the data to reject the null
hypothesis. Thus, I do not find compelling evidence that the acceleration of ESO vesting
periods causes changes in shareholders’ equity and cannot reject H1.
Table 4 provides the mean abnormal returns for accelerated options that were
underwater and those that were in-the-money. Underwater options had a mean abnormal
return of 0.55% while the mean abnormal return of in-the-money options was -4.62%.
There is a large discrepancy between these two returns, however, since there were only 6
in-the-money observations, the difference should be interpreted with caution. By
removing the in-the-money options from the sample, the mean return jumped from 0.05%
to 0.55%. The high p-value of this test, 0.34, indicates that there is not considerable
evidence in the data to reject the null hypothesis. I do not find compelling evidence that
the abnormal returns were a function of the state of the options at the time of
acceleration, and thus cannot reject H2.
Figure 1 provides a plot of all the abnormal returns that have been scaled to
account for each company’s market capitalization. There is an apparent slight trend of

18

increasing returns as the percent accelerated increases. Though this trend is visible, it is
not statistically significant due to the low R-square (found in Table 5). Since the
R-square is so small, 0.015, the explanatory power of my model is low and the trend line
can not be applied to the entire population. I do not find compelling evidence that the
amount of expense accelerated, as it relates to market capitalization, is associated with
shareholder’s responses to acceleration announcements. Due to these findings, I cannot
reject H3.

Summary & Conclusion
In this paper, I examine the effect of the acceleration of stock options in the
anticipation of FAS 123 (R) has on shareholder equity. The purpose of this standard was
to improve transparency of financial statements and also force companies to account for
what was viewed by many to be a real expense. The strategy of option acceleration taken
by hundreds of companies was driven by many different motives which were discussed
earlier. This study aimed to determine what shareholder’s perceived managements’
motives to be; positive returns would be associated with positive motive perceptions and
negative returns would be associated with negative motive perceptions. However, I did
not find any compelling empirical evidence on the effect that acceleration announcements
had on shareholder equity. Also, I did not find any empirical evidence on whether the
state of options or scaled acceleration amounts swayed shareholder responses. For these
reasons, I cannot reject any of my three null hypotheses.
By testing a sample of only 62 companies, this made finding statistically
significant results difficult from the beginning. My small sample of the largest monetary
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accelerators has failed to provide any results that can be attributed to the entire
acceleration population. To improve the testing that I have performed, I would use the
entire 749 company population and perform the same tests. This would provide more
accurate results and I would see clearly how option acceleration affected shareholder
equity. Testing the entire population would also provide more confidence in how
shareholder’s responded to the state of options and also the amount accelerated.
Another factor that could have affected my testing was the small three day
window that I used. A larger window may have provided market reactions that occurred
greater than one day subsequent to the acceleration announcement. Also, the news of the
acceleration could have possibly leaked before it took affect so it would be beneficial to
look at the stock returns of multiple days prior to the announcement as well. This larger
window could provide larger shareholder response and therefore more significant results.
The results in this paper contribute to our understanding of how option
acceleration affected shareholder equity for the 62 largest monetary accelerators. Due to
the lack of empirical evidence that I obtained, these results can not be applied to the
entire acceleration population. Replicating my tests on a much larger sample appears to
be a fruitful avenue for future research.
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Table 2
Bear Stearns 749 Company
Population
33%
19%
16%
15%
2%
10%
2%

Information Technology
Health Care
Financials
Consumer Discretionary
Consumer Staples
Industrials
Materials

My 62 Company Sample
55%
21%
5%
11%
2%
5%
2%

Figure 1
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Table 3
Abnormal Returns Vs Market Returns
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Sample Variance
Kurtosis
Skewness
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum
Count
Largest(1)
Smallest(1)
Confidence
Level(95.0%)
T-stat

0.000504097
0.006119078
0.000912503
#N/A
0.048181672
0.002321474
22.33073599
-3.179423106
0.434736813
-0.289503012
0.1452338
0.031253999
62
0.1452338
-0.289503012
0.012235853
0.082381157

Table 4
Abnormal Returns: Underwater Vs In the Money

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
t Critical one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
t Critical two-tail

Abnormal Return for
Underwater
0.005517399
0.001000736
56

Abnormal return for In the
Money
-0.046286724
0.014405134
6

0
5
1.053345853
0.170200327
2.015048372
0.340400655
2.570581835
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Table 5
Percentage of Market Cap Accelerated
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
0.123392076
R Square
0.015225604
Adjusted R Square
-0.001187302
Standard Error
0.048210266
Observations
62

Intercept
$ Accelerated / Market
Cap

Coefficients
-0.005390084

Standard
Error
0.008656679

t Stat
-0.62265

P-value
0.535874

0.277491574

0.288107973

0.963151

0.339337
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